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1EFFICIENCY AND CORE PROPERTIES OF VALUATION
EQUILIBRIUM WITH INCREASING RETURNS
Peter Hammond and Antonio Villar
A B S T R A C T
This paper considers market economies involving the choice of a public
environment when there are nonconvexities in production. It discusses the
decentralization of e¢cient allocations by means of valuation equilibrium,
adapting to many private goods the notion due to Mas-Colell (1980) which
extends the Lindahlian approach to the pure theory of public goods. It is
shown that a valuation equilibrium satis…es the two welfare theorems and is
in the core.
Keywords: ValuationEquilibrium, IncreasingReturns toScale, E¢ciency.
21 INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the market decentralization of optimal allo-
cations in a modern mixed economy. By this we mean a market economy
with both private and public sectors. The private sector consists of house-
holds and …rms who make decisions within their own private feasible sets.
The public sector chooses actions which may a¤ect overall economic activity.
Private agents’ feasible sets are determined by their individual characteristics
(technology and private endowments), the market conditions (including the
actions of other private agents), and a set of public policy variables that are
chosen by the public sector. These public policy variables may include the
realization of public projects (the provision of public goods together with the
ways of …nancing them), the allocation of property rights (and in particular
the operation of a tax-subsidy system), the regulation of economic activities
(setting quotas, pricecontrols or quality standards, amongmany others), etc.
A speci…cation of these policy variables will be called a public environment,
or simply an environment.
In this type of economy we consider a form of decentralization which
makes use of the notion of valuation equilibrium in a suitable extended sense.
A valuation equilibrium is usually de…ned as a commodity price vector, a
valuation function (or a non-linear tax system) for pricing the public envi-
ronment, and a feasible allocation that includes the public environment, such
that: (a) Each consumer’s equilibrium combination of private consumption
together with the public environment is weakly preferred to any other which
is a¤ordable given budget constraint de…ned by the price vector and the val-
uation function; (b) Each …rm’s equilibrium combination of commodity net
supplies and public environment maximizes net pro…ts over its production
set.
The notion of valuation equilibrium was introduced in Mas-Colell (1980)
to study the choice of public projects in an economy with a single private
good, which was taken as the numéraire. He showed that valuation equilib-
ria satisfy the standard welfare properties of competitive equilibria (the two
welfare theorems). Mas-Colell’s work was subsequently extended by several
di¤erent authors to allowfor the presence of several private and public goods
in the economy. See, for example, the contributions by Mas-Colell & Sil-
vestre (1989), Diamantaras & Wilkie (1994), Diamantaras & Gilles (1996),
Diamantaras, Gilles & Scotchmer (1996) and Hammond & Villar (1998),
(1999). These extensions are usually obtained under the assumption that,
given the public environment, conditional production sets are all convex. In
other words, for each …xed choice of public environment, the resulting condi-
tional private economy is a classical competitive one, as in standard general
3equilibrium theory. Or at least, the production of public goods can be fully
described by a cost function.
This paper extends the analysis further, allowing for more general non-
convex production sets, while keeping the e¢ciency properties of the equilib-
rium notion. The interest of this extension is threefold. First and foremost,
it allows to deal with economies whose private production sector exhibits
increasing returns to scale, or …xed costs, or uses some indivisible commodi-
ties as inputs. Second, note that in some cases increasing returns to scale
arise precisely from the public environment itself, as in the case of transport
or information networks. So we relax the restrictive assumption that the
production of public goods takes place within a standard convex technology.
Third, our framework permitsone clearly to identify theset ofpublic environ-
ments with the public sector “control variables”, as opposed to other models
in which the environment may include also private projects precisely in order
to ensure convex conditional production sets, given the public environment
[e.g. Hammond & Villar (1998)].
Extending the notion of valuation equilibria to this more general setting
requires taking into account two di¤erent, yet related, complications. One
has to do with the fact that pro…t maximization might be an inadequate
description of …rms’ behaviour. This is because when there are increasing
returns to scale or other non-convexities, there may be anempty set of pro…t-
maximizing production plans. Another complication concerns the necessary
conditions for e¢ciency in an economy with non-convex production sets.
There are several di¤erent ways to deal with these complications —e.g.,
modelling the behaviour of …rms in terms of “marginal” pricing rules and
imposing restrictions on the admissible characteristics of the agents.1 Here,
however, we shall approach those problems by giving households an active
role as co-owners of the private …rms. In particular, it will be assumed that
households instruct the…rms to choose those production plans that maximize
their owners’ aggregate expenditure capacity [an idea formerly introduced in
Villar (2000b)].
This approach has two main consequences. First, …rms do not choose
their own policies independently. Rather, they try to implement the owners’
objectives. Second, each household’s feasible set and preference relation may
be de…ned on a more extensive domain than in the classical Arrow-Debreu
model. Infactthis formulationwill require households’ incometo be speci…ed
as general income functions that can be regarded as including a system of
1The reader is referred to Bonnisseau & Cornet (1988), Brown (1991), Quinzii (1992)
and Villar (2000a) for a detailed discussion of general equilibrium models with noncon-
vexities.
4taxes and transfers.
Accordingly, a valuation equilibrium (VE, for short) is de…ned here as a
combination consisting of a public environment, a price vector, and a feasi-
ble allocation such that: (a) No household prefers an alternative allocation
that is a¤ordable, given the maximum income achievable; (b) Firms are in
equilibrium according to the households’ unanimous prescriptions; and (c)
Total income equals the worth of total resources plus total pro…ts (aggregate
budget balance).
The reference model is presented in section 2. Following the approach in
Mas-Colell (1980), where no linear structure is imposed on the set of public
projects, we shall consider an economy with an abstract set of public envi-
ronments lacking any formal structure. This setup includes many di¤erent
familiar models as special cases. Private agents’ feasible sets and preferences
will be de…ned conditional on the public environment, the latter being cho-
sen by the public sector. For each given value of the public environment, the
households’ conditional feasible sets are standard, whereas no such a restric-
tion will be imposed on the conditional production sets. The equilibrium
notion proposed aims at ensuring that the two welfare theorems hold in this
context.
With several private goods, two di¤erent ways of extending the notion
of valuation equilibrium have been considered. First, agents can be myopic
andcompare di¤erent environments taking market prices as given[Hammond
& Villar (1999)]. Second, agents can be far-sighted, and compare di¤erent
public environments after taking into account the induced changes in the
relative prices of private commodities [e.g. Diamantaras & Giles (1996),
Hammond & Villar (1998)]. Interestingly enough, whether agents are myopic
or far sighted makes no di¤erence to our results, which are valid under the
same assumptions in either case.
Section 3 contains the results for the case in which agents are myopic.
These results can be summarized as follows: (a) A VE is Pareto optimal
if consumers are locally non-satiated and the income schedule is balanced;
(b) Every Pareto optimal allocation can be decentralized as VE; and (c) A
VE yields a core allocation, when the income schedule satis…es balancedness
within coalitions.
Next, Section 4 brie‡y discusses the case in which consumers are far-
sighted, under the simplifying assumption that their forecast of a change in
the environment is a common point estimation that depends on the status
quo prices and public environment, as well as on the new environment. It is
straightforward to adapt the results of Section 3 to this context.
A few …nal comments are gathered in section 5.
52 THE MODEL
Consider a mixedeconomy consisting private agents and a public sector. The
private agents in the economy are assumed to be m households, indexed by
i 2 I := f1;2;:::;mg; together with n private …rms, indexed by j 2 J :=
f1;2;:::;ng: The commodity space is made of ` goods and services.
Households are assumed to own both the initial endowments and shares
in the private …rms. They also play an active role in the economy as both
consumers and shareholders. More precisely, in our model all decisions re-
garding consumption and production will be ultimately made by the house-
holds. That will become apparent in the way of modelling their demand
mappings and in the equilibrium notion. Let ! 2 R` represent the aggregate
initial endowment vector of private goods.
The public sector makes choices in an abstract set Z whose elements,
denoted by z; include those variables de…ning the public environment. No
particular structure will be postulated on the set Z; except those derived
from the fact that each point of Z must describe a consistent set of parameter
values (environmental feasibility constraints). Each agent’s feasible set and
preferences may be a¤ectedby z 2 Z: In particular, ifthe public environment
z involves public goods, the …rms thatproducethemwill be restrictedtomeet
output targets for those public goods.
For each …rm j 2 J; let Yj be the jth …rm’s production set, that we take
as a subset of R` £ Z; for the sake of generality. Denote by Yj(z) ½ R` …rm
j’s restricted conditional production set when the public environment takes
the value z 2 Z: That is,
Yj(z) ´ fyj 2 R
` = (yj;z) 2 Yjg
The restrictions derived from the public environment may refer to the use
or production of some public goods, but may also include quantity restric-
tions, quality speci…cations, etc. We shall assume that production sets are
topologically closed and comprehensive. More precisely: For all z 2 Z; Yj(z)
is closed in R`, with Yj(z) ¡ R`
+ ½ Yj(z): Comprehensiveness justi…es taking
the set P = R`
+nf0g as the price space for private goods, as we actually do.
For each z 2 Z; Y(z) stands for the Cartesianproduct of the n conditional
production sets. That is, Y(z) ´
Q
j2J Yj(z). Points in Y(z) will be denoted
by e y = (yj)j2J.
Given a price vector p 2 P; a public environment z 2 Z; and a collection
e y 2 Y(z); the scalar ¼j(z;p;e y) denotes …rm j’s pro…ts relative to (z;p;e y): In
the case when prices are linear, when the …rm does not use public goods as
inputs, and when there are no taxes or subsidies, we have the usual formula
6¼j(z;p;e y) = pyj: But our model allows for the presence of taxes on pro…ts
and non-linear prices (e.g., two-part tari¤s on some inputs produced by …rms
with increasing returns to scale, or Lindahl prices paid for the use of public
inputs). For this reason we use the more general notation ¼j(z;p;e y):
Our model does not regard …rms as independent agents. Instead, they
merely implement the decisions of the households who own them. Thus,
given a price vector and a collection (yi
j)i2I of (usually inconsistent) con-
sumers’ instructions to …rm j, its “supply” is some function of the house-




households’ proposals, with weights equal to their shares µij.
For each household i 2 I; let Xi ½ R` £ Z denote i’s consumption set,
and let Xi(z) stand for consumer i’s conditional consumption set, de…nedby:
Xi(z) = fxi 2 R
` = (xi;z) 2 Xig
That is, Xi(z) consists of vectors of private goods that are feasible when the
public environment is z. Assume that each household i 2 I has a preference
ordering that can be represented by the ordinal utility function ui : Xi ! R:
Given z 2 Z; we can write the conditional utility function as uz
i : Xi(z) ! R;
with values given by uz
i(xi) := ui(xi;z): Note that household i’s preferences
are allowed to depend on all the variables in each element z of Z; and not
only on the commodity vectors.
For eachz 2 Z; X(z) stands for theCartesian productofthe mconditional
consumptionsets. That is, X(z) ´
Q
i2I Xi(z). PointsinX(z)will bedenoted
by e x = (xi)i2I.
For each given z 2 Z; each household i 2 I is assumed to have a con-
ditional income function rz
i : P £ Y(z) ! R: Given a price vector p 2 P
and a collection e y 2 Y(z); the value rz
i(p;e y) of this mapping is the income
that household i obtains in environment z at prices p when it takes e y as the
relevant vector of production plans. The conditional income function may
include not only private income from endowments and …rms’ dividends, but
also government net transfers in the form of taxes and subsidies, including
(possibly non-linear) prices for the public goods. To be more concrete, we
can think of the ith consumer’s conditional income function as a mapping of
the form:
rz
i(p;e y) = p!i +
X
j2J
µij¼j(z;p; e y) +¿i(z;p)
where !i describes the household i’s initial endowments, and µij its share of
…rm j (with
P
i2I !i = !; 0 ￿ µij ￿ 1 for all i;j; and
P
i2I µij = 1; for all j);
while ¿i(:) is a tax-subsidy mapping that depends on the public environment
7and the commodity price vector. This expression shows how consumer i’s
income can be regarded as the sum of the market value of its private assets,
plus a public sector net transfer ¿i.
Consider now the following de…nition:
De…nition 1 An income schedule isa collection R := (rz
i)i2I of mappings,







An income schedule is a collection of functions that generate a self-
…nancing income distribution, for every given z 2 Z. That is, the aggregate
income does not exceed the value of initial endowments plus the aggregate
pro…ts (or losses, if negative).
Remark 1 We assume that the income schedule indirectly includes the pos-
sible taxes on the …rms via the pro…t components.
Given a point (p;z) 2 P£Z; household i’s demand for private commodi-
ties is obtained as a solution to the following program:
max(xi;e y) uz
i(xi)
s:t: : xi 2 Xi(z)







Note that the variables which household i is choosing include both the con-
sumption plan xi and all the private …rms’ production plans (actually, those
corresponding to …rms in which household i has some positive share).
Let Yi(p;z) denote the set of points e yi 2 Y(z) such that (xi;e yi) solves
program [1]; for some xi 2 Xi(z): Obviously this set, which may well vary
from consumer to consumer, consists of production plans that maximize con-








i) = e y 2 Y(z)
ª
as the income that consumer i “demands” when facing the price vector p and
public environment z: This is the relevant analogy to the usual competitive
budget set, in the sense that without taxes or transfers, the amount ri(p;z)
corresponds to the income that consumer i obtains when …rms maximize
pro…ts at given prices. Clearly, ri(p;z) = rz
i(p;e y) whenever e y 2 Yi(p;z):












8with the equality holding if and only if e y 2
T
i2I Yi(p;z):
To summarize, an economy is a collection of: (a) m households, each
characterized by a consumption set and an ordinal utility function; (b) n
…rms, each characterized by a production set; (c) a domain Z of public en-
vironments; (d) a vector ! of aggregate initial endowments; (e) an income
schedule R, which involves the distribution of private assets as well as a
tax-subsidy system. An economy can be written concisely in the form:
E = [(Xi;ui)i2I;(Yj)j2J;Z;!;R]
Consider now the following:
De…nition 2 An allocation for an economy E is a point [z;e x;e y] such that
(e x;e y) 2 X(z) £ Y(z): If, furthermore,
P
i2I xi ￿ ! +
P
j2J yj; then [z;e x;e y]
is an attainable allocation for E:
An allocation is a public environment and a collection of actions for con-
sumers and …rms in the private commodity space that are compatible with
such environment. An allocation is attainable when the aggregate consump-
tion does not exceed the aggregate production plus the available resources.
The set of attainable allocations is denoted by A(E):
Thefollowing de…nition makes precise the equilibrium notion. We assume
that the net revenues derived from the activity of public …rms, if any, are
distributed through the tax-subsidy system.
De…nition 3 A valuation equilibrium (VE for short) for an economy E
is a price vector p¤ 2 P; a public environment z¤ 2 Z; and an allocation
(e x¤;e y¤) 2 X(z¤) £ Y(z¤) such that:
(a) For all i 2 I; one has ui(x¤
i;z¤) ¸ ui(xi;z) for all (xi;z) 2 Xi such
that p¤xi ￿ ri(p¤;z):












i2I ri(p¤;z¤) = p¤!+ p¤P
j2J y¤
j:
That is, a valuation equilibrium is a price vector, a public environment,
and an allocation such that: (a) no household i 2 I …nds it individually ben-
e…cial to choose an alternative pair (xi;z) that is a¤ordable at given prices,
even given the highest income achievable; (b) all households unanimously
agree on the production schedule and the …rms implement such a decision;
(c) all markets clear; and (d) total income equals the worth of total resources
9plus total pro…ts. Clearly part (d) of the de…nition is redundant when con-
sumers are locally non-satiated, because then it is implied by parts (a) and
(c) together.
If the public environment is …xed, a valuation equilibrium reduces to a
competitive equilibrium in the corresponding private good classical economy.
To see this, simply set Z = fzg; and suppose that all production sets given z
are non-empty, closed, convex and comprehensive subsets of R`: Note that,
with z …xed, each consumer’s income is maximized at given prices if and only
if each individual …rm maximizes pro…ts at these prices. That is, ri(p;z) =
p!i +
P
j2J µijpyj(p); where yj(p) is a point in Yj(z) such that pyj ¸ py0
j
for all y0
j 2 Yj(z); and all j 2 J:
If one keeps the assumption that Z = fzg; but allows …rms to have non-
convex productionsets, then a valuation equilibrium corresponds to amarket
equilibrium with active consumers, as de…ned in Villar (2000b).
When Z has more than one element and the private …rms have convex
conditional production sets, a valuation equilibrium as de…ned here coin-
cides with the concept considered in Hammond & Villar (1999), where some
speci…c examples are discussed in detail.
3 THE RESULTS FOR THE MYOPIC CASE
We now proceed to the main results, focusing …rst on the myopic case in
which consumers evaluate alternatives taking commodity prices as given.
The extensionto thecase offar-sightedconsumers is formally straightforward
—see Section 4 below.
Our …rst result says that a valuation equilibrium is Pareto optimal, no
matter what pricing policy the …rms follow. The second establishes that
any interior Pareto e¢cient allocation can be decentralized as a valuation
equilibrium. Finally, it will be shown that a valuation equilibrium is in the
core, provided that inter-coalitional transfers are excluded.
The following de…nition makes precise the notion of “balancedness” for
the income schedule, a restriction that plays a relevant role in the results
presented below. Let YA(z) = Y(z)
T
A(E) denote the set of production
plans that correspond to some attainable allocation for a given environment
z 2 Z. Then:
De…nition 4 An income schedule R is balanced if, for every z 2 Z; and
all (p;e y) in P £ YA(z); we have:
P
i2I rz
i(p;e y) = p! +
P
j2J pyj:
10An income schedule is balanced if it ensures the equality between aggre-
gate income andtotal pro…ts plus the market value ofthe initial endowments,
for all possible attainable states. This implies that Walras Law holds when
consumers’ preferences are locally non-satiated and the involved allocation
is attainable.
In the myopic case, consumers evaluate alternatives at given prices. The
following result is obtained:
Theorem 1 Let [p¤;z¤;e x¤;e y¤] be a valuation equilibrium. Suppose that con-
sumers are locally non-satiated and that the income schedule is balanced.
Then the resulting allocation is Pareto optimal.
Proof.
Let [p¤;z¤;e x¤;e y¤] be a valuation equilibrium. Suppose that [z;e x; e y] is a
feasible allocation such that ui(xi;z) ¸ ui(x¤
i;z¤) for all consumers i 2 I:
Because this allocation is feasible, it follows that
P
i2I xi ￿ ! +
P
j2J yj:
But p¤ > 0 and so
P
i2I p¤xi ￿ p¤!+
P
j2J p¤yj [2]
Next, because feasibility implies that e y 2 Y(z); it follows from the local
non-satiation hypothesis and the de…nition of valuation equilibrium that
p¤xi ¸ ri(p¤;z) ¸ rz
i(p¤; e y) [3]
for all i 2 I: Moreover, the balancedness condition
P
i2I rz
i(p¤;e y) = p¤! + P






for all i 2 I: But this implies that ui(xi;z) ￿ ui(x¤
i;z¤) and so ui(xi;z) =
ui(x¤
i;z¤) for all consumers i 2 I: So a Pareto superior allocation cannot
exist.
Note that the proof would not work without the balancedness condi-
tion. This is because we can not exclude the case in which
P
i2I ri(p;z) < P
j2J pyj + p!; for some e y 2 Y(z); so equation [4] may not hold.2 The use
of ri(p;z) instead of rz
i(p;e y) in the de…nition of equilibrium is also necessary
in order to derive [3]. If instead one took rz
i(p;e y) as the relevant income
2This would happen when the income rule wastes part of the resources out of equilib-
rium.
11mapping when increasing returns to scale are permitted, one could not de-
duce that p¤xi ¸ rz
i(p¤; e y) when consumer i weakly prefers (xi;z) to (x¤
i;z¤):
Example 6.1 in Villar (2000a) serves to illustrate this point further.
Let us move on to the decentralizability of Pareto e¢cient allocations by
way of valuation equilibria. We can prove:
Theorem 2 Let [z¤; e x¤;e y¤] be an interior Pareto optimal allocation —i.e.,
one for which each consumer i 2 I has x¤
i in the interior of Xi(z¤): Suppose
that, for all i 2 I and all z 2 Z; the set Xi(z) is a convex subset of R`
+; and
the conditional utility function uz
i : Xi ! R is continuous, quasi-concave,
and satis…es local non-satiation. Then, there exist a price vector p¤ 2 P and
an income schedule R such that [p¤;z¤;e x¤; e y¤] is a valuation equilibrium.
Proof.
Take z¤ as given. For each i 2 I let U¤
i denote the upper contour set
of points in Xi(z¤) such that uz¤
i (xi) ¸ uz¤
i (x¤
i): This is a convex set by
assumption. Now let U¤ =
P
i2I U¤
i be the aggregate upper contour set,
which is also convex. By local non-satiation, x¤ :=
P
i2I x¤
i must be a point
on its boundary. Therefore, the standard supporting hyperplane theorem for
convex sets in …nite-dimensional Euclidean space ensures that there exists
p¤ 6= 0 such that p¤x¤ minimizes p¤x over U¤: From this it follows that
x¤
i minimizes p¤xi on U¤
i , for all i 2 I: A standard argument shows that,
because x¤




i (xi) for all xi 2 Xi(z¤) such that p¤xi ￿ p¤x¤
i:
Let us show now that [p¤;z¤;e x¤; e y¤] is a valuation equilibrium for some
income schedule R: That requires constructing a suitable income schedule
and then checking that parts (a) and (d) of de…nition 3 are satis…ed (parts
(b) and(c) being satis…ed by construction). But as remarked after De…nition
3, in fact part (d) is an implication of parts (a) and (c), so it will be enough
merely to con…rm part (a).
Consider …rst the compensation function, relative to (p¤;x¤
i;z¤), de…ned








This is the income that consumer i needs to spend on private goods in order
to be no worse o¤ than at (x¤
i;z¤) when the environment changes to z: We
take Ei(z) = +1 if there is no xi 2 Xi(z) that allows consumer i to achieve
utility level ui(x¤
i;z¤) when environment is z:







that is, ®i is the percentage of the aggregate expenditure which consumer i
needs to make x¤
i a¤ordable. Consider now the income schedule R de…ned
so that, for every given z 2 Z; e y 2 Y(z) and i 2 I; we have:
rz












i(p¤; e y) ￿
P
j2J p¤yj + p¤! —that is, R is an income
schedule.
Therefore, part (a) of the de…nition is satis…ed provided rz¤
i (p¤;e y¤) =
ri(p¤;z¤). To see this, suppose that e y¤ = 2
Tm
i=1Yi(p¤;z¤): This implies that



























But this is not possible because Ei(z¤) = p¤x¤
i:Therefore, rz¤
i (p¤; e y¤) =
ri(p¤;z¤) for all i:
Finally, take a consumer i and any consumption plan (xi;z) 2 Xi £ Z
such that ui(xi;z) > ui(x¤
i;z¤): We have to show that this consumption plan
is not a¤ordable given the prices and the income schedule. Indeed, suppose








Thus part (a) of the de…nition is satis…ed and the proof is complete.
Let us brie‡y comment on the assumptions of this theorem. The inte-
riority condition, requiring that x¤
i is in the interior of Xi(z¤) for all i; is
clearly too strong. It could be dispensed with if we used the notion of com-
pensated VE and then applied a standard argument to show that, under
assumptions such as non-oligarchy [see Hammond (1998)], the compensated
valuation equilibrium is a valuation equilibrium.
We have assumed Xi(z) ½ R`
+ for the sake of simplicity in exposition.
This together with the interiority condition ensures that
P
h2I p¤x¤
h > 0 so
that the share ®i is well de…ned.
The conditions imposed on conditional utility functions are standard and
need no further comment.
13Theorem 2 can be somewhat re…ned under our assumption about condi-
tional production sets. In fact, when conditional production sets are closed
and comprehensive in R`; then every e¢cient allocation can be decentralized
as a valuation equilibrium in which all …rms followthe marginal pricing rule.
That is to say, p¤ 2
Tn
j=1NYj(z¤)(y¤
j); where NYj(z)(yj) stands for Clarke
normal cone of Yj(z) at yj:3
Observe that the …rst welfare theorem requires balancedness of the in-
come schedule whereas the second welfare theorem does not. The lack of
balancedness of the income schedule out of equilibrium, which is permitted
by our de…nitions as long as then there is an unspent surplus, turns out
to be essential in order to get the result in Theorem 2. Indeed, one can
deduce from example 2.3 in Diamantaras, Gilles & Scotchmer (1996) that
there is a fundamental trade-o¤ between complexity and out-of-equilibrium
balancedness.4 To be more precise, one cannot get both balancedness and
decentralizability when consumers are myopic. Decentralizing a Pareto e¢-
cient allocation as a VE, when consumers take as given the prices of private
commodities, requires the Government to exercise an expropriation power
that “punishes” the consumers who deviate from the chosen allocation.
Our last result in thissectionreferstothesocial stability ofVE, as implied
by the notion of core allocations. The de…nition of the core presented below
is relative to a given pair of parameter vectors, which are to be interpreted
as an assignment of property rights. One set of parameters tells us how total
pro…ts (or aggregate production shares) are distributed among consumers.
The other expresses the entitlements of individuals on initial endowments.
De…nition 5 Let µ = (µi)i2I and ® = (®i)i2I be two m-dimensional vectors




i2I ®i = 1: A feasible alloca-
tion [z;(xi)i2I; e y] is in the core relative to (µ;®) if there is no “blocking”












3Let us recall here that the Clarke Normal Cone at a point y¤ 2 Y is the convex cone
generated by the vectors perpendicular to Y at y¤, and by the limits of vectors which are
perpendicular to Y in a neighbourhood of y¤ [Cf. Quinzii (1992, p. 19)]. It can be shown
that if py0
j ¸ pyj; for all yj 2 Yj(z), then p is a marginal price system relative to Yj(z)
at y0
j. When Yj(z) is convex the converse is also true. Thus marginal pricing coincides
with pro…t maximization when production sets are convex.
For a re…nement of the Clarke normal cone due to Mordukhovich, see Khan (1999).
4We thank Dimitrios Diamantaras and Rob Gilles for drawing our attention to this
aspect of the model.
14(ii) ui(x0
i;z0) ¸ ui(xi;z); 8 i 2 S; with strict inequality for at least one
i 2 S:
Thus, a core allocation is one in which no coalition can re-arrange the
economy, using only its own resources as de…ned by (µ;®), so that the result-
ing allocation is weakly preferred by all its members, and strictly preferred
by some.
The next de…nition extends the notion of balanced income schedules to
individuals:
De…nition 6 An income schedule R is individually balanced, relative to
(µ;®) if for any i 2 I and each (p;z;e y); one has
rz




These de…nitions imply the following result:
Theorem 3 Let [p¤;z¤;e x¤;e y¤] be a valuation equilibrium. Suppose that con-
sumers are locally non-satiated and that R is individually balanced relative to
(µ;®): Then, the resulting allocation is in the core.
Proof.










(ii) ui(xi;z) ¸ ui(x¤
i;z¤); 8 i 2 S:












for all i 2 I: But then (i) above implies that p¤xi = rz
i(p¤;e y) for all i 2 I:
Because the allocation is a VE, it follows that ui(x¤
i;z¤) ¸ ui(xi;z) and so
ui(xi;z) = ui(x¤
i;z¤) for all i 2 S: This proves that a blocking coalition
cannot exist.
Theorem 3 ensures that valuation equilibria generate allocations in the
core. The core here is de…ned with respect to a series of parameters that
describe the distribution of property rights. In our model this is absolutely
essential, because the core is always dependent on the structure of individu-
als’ entitlements and also, as opposed to the usual core theorems, production
sets are not assumed to be convex cones. It is easy to see that a richer
description of these property rights is well compatible with our result (e.g.
specifying consumer i’s shares in individual …rms).
15Remark 2 Theorem 3 requires, in addition to local non-satiation, to extend
the balancedeness condition to all possible coalitions. This is formally equiv-
alent to require individual balancedness.
4 THE RESULTS FOR THE FAR-SIGHTED
CASE
It has been assumed in the discussion so far that consumers are myopic, in
the sense that they evaluate alternative actions taking the prices of private
commodities as given. As in Hammond & Villar (1998), one can argue that
when there are non-convexities, any change in the public environment may
well inducesubstantial changes in market prices, and sohave a largein‡uence
onindividuals’ budget sets. This reasoningseems evenmore compelling when
conditional production sets are not convex.
So now we suppose instead that consumers are far sighted. Speci…cally,
consumers believe they can compute the changes inthe prices of private com-
modities that result from changes in the environment. To make things sim-
ple, de…ne the consumers’ common price forecast as a single-valued mapping
½ : P £ Z £ Z ! P; satisfying ½(p;z;z) = p: The mapping is to be inter-
preted as follows. For each given (p;z;z0) 2 P £ Z£ Z; the point ½(p;z;z0)
describes the consumers’ common forecast of the price vector that results
when the status quo (p;z) changes to a new environment z0: Moreover, the
price forecast associated with maintaining the status quo (p;z) is assumed
to be precisely p:
Function ½ becomes now part of the description of the economy. There-
fore, we shall denote by E½ an economy in which agents calculate the change
of prices associated with a change in the environment according to function
½:
Now we can introduce the following de…nition:
De…nition 7 A far-sighted valuation equilibrium (FSVE for short) for
an economy E½; is a price vector p¤ 2 P; a public environment z¤ 2 Z; and
an allocation (e x¤;e y¤) such that:
(i) For every i 2 I; the pair (x¤
i;z¤) maximizes ui with respect to (xi;z)
subject to the constraints (xi;z) 2 Xi and ½(p¤;z¤;z)xi ￿ ri[½(p¤;z¤;z);z]:
















This de…nition recognizes the ability which consumers are assumed to
possess of evaluating alternatives at prices that are dependent on the en-
16vironment. Parts (ii), (iii) and (iv) in the de…nition of FSVE are already
familiar. Part (i) says that no consumer …nds it individually bene…cial to
choose an alternative allocation that is a¤ordable with the highest income
achievable, according to the associated price forecast. Note that the very
de…nition of ½ implies that p¤ = ½(p¤;z¤;z¤):
The following results are immediate extensions of those above, thus the
proofs are omitted.
Theorem 4 Let [p¤;z¤;e x¤; e y¤] be a FSVE and suppose that consumers’ pref-
erences are locally non-satiated and that the income schedule is balanced.
Then the resulting allocation is Pareto optimal.
Theorem 5 Let [z¤; e x¤; e y¤] be a Pareto optimal allocation satisfying the con-
dition that x¤
i in the interior of Xi(z¤) for all i: Suppose that, for all i 2 I
and all z 2 Z; the set Xi(z) is convex and the conditional utility function uz
i :
Xi(z) ! R is continuous, quasi-concave, and satis…es local non-satiation.
Then, there exist a price vector p¤ 2 P and an income schedule R such that
[p¤;z¤;e x¤;e y¤] is a far-sighted valuation equilibrium.
Theorem 6 Let [p¤;z¤; e x¤;e y¤] be a FVE. Suppose that the consumers’ pref-
erencesare locally non-satiated and that the income schedule R isindividually
balanced relative to (µ;®): Then, the resulting allocation is in the core.
5 FINAL COMMENTS
We have presented a notion of valuation equilibrium whose usual e¢ciency
properties extend to those economies in which the conditional production
sets need not be convex. This extension requires households to compute
their demands adjusting the production schedule in order to maximize their
income (besides allowingfor changes in thepublic environment). Under fairly
general assumptions, it has been shown that a VE (resp. a FSVE) satis…es
the two welfare theorems andyields core allocations. Inparticular, the model
allows for the presence of increasing returns to scale, or more general forms
of non-convexities in production sets, in the conditional economies. It is
worth stressing that the model works the same way whether we assume that
consumers are myopic or far-sighted.
Given the e¢ciency properties of valuation equilibria, it is not surpris-
ing that the existence of an equilibrium cannot be ensured in this general
framework.
It follows from the …rst welfare theorem that the notion of valuation
equilibrium imposes restrictions on the admissible behaviour of the …rms,
17even though no speci…c policy is assumed a priori. Indeed, the …rms must
adhere to some form of marginal pricing, since e¢ciency requires equating
the marginal rates of transformation to the relative prices. For instance,
when …rms are standard (closed convex and comprehensive production sets),
a valuation equilibrium corresponds to a competitive equilibrium. When
conditional production sets are not convex there are some degrees of freedom
because marginal pricing is not uniquely determined (e.g. there are di¤erent
systems of two part tari¤s, some forms of constrained pro…t maximization
and some perfect price discrimination policies that may be compatible with
the marginal pricing principle).
The e¢ciency of valuation equilibria has also consequences on the admis-
sible behaviour of the public sector, even though the tax system is hidden
behind the abstract income schedule used in the model. On the one hand,
it requires that the production of public goods must be …nanced by some
kind of (possibly non-linear) Lindahl pricing. On the other hand, when con-
ditional production sets are not convex the system of transfers will imply
positive transfers for some consumers and negative transfers for some others
in equilibrium [on this see the discussion in Vohra (1991)]. This implicitly
says that in most cases the use of cost-sharing methods or two-part tari¤s
will not be enough to ensure e¢ciency.
The public sector’s choice space has been modelled as a given …xed set,
for the sake of simplicity in exposition. Yet it may be a¤ected by the actions
of some other agents and by the market prices of private goods. The type of
variables included in Z implicitly express our assumptions about the in‡u-
ence that the public sector has on the private economy. It seems natural to
identify the elements of the public environment with those variables which
are usually decided upon by the public sector (e.g. decisions that respect the
prevailing constitutional rights). Hence, Z typically includes aspects related
to the public expenditure and in particular the provision of public goods,
the tax system, the regulation of some instances of the economic activity
such as imports, migration, energy prices, production of genetically modi…ed
organisms, etc. All these are “control variables” whose values can be chosen
by some central agency.
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